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INTRODUCTION

This paper is an outgrowth of remarks I prepared for a panel
on tort reform and proposals to limit remedies, ' a potentially broad
topic encompassing many different perspectives. However, in light
of current events the topic can be narrowed to one question, punitive
damages and tort reform, and more specifically to one case: Philip
Morris USA v. Williams.2 The Supreme Court held in Philip Morris
that a punitive damage award that punishes a defendant for harm
inflicted on persons who are not before the court is a taking
of
3
Clause.
Process
Due
Constitution's
the
of
violation
in
property
I must disclose that I was involved in Philip Morris, though
somewhat tangentially. I was drawn into the case, as I was in State
Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co. v. Campbell,4 as an amicus for the
*
Professor of Law and Paul J. Liacos Scholar, Boston University,
knhylton@bu.edu. I thank participants at the AALS Annual Meeting 2007 for
their helpful responses.

1. For the panel description, see http://www.aals.org/am2007/wednesday/
remedies.htm (last visited Sept. 14, 2007).
2. 127 S. Ct. 1057 (2007). This essay began as a set of remarks on the case
before it was decided. It has obviously evolved since then to include a critique of
the decision.
3. Id. at 1063.
4. 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
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plaintiff-that is, the party trying to hold on to the large punitive
award ($79.5 million in this case, $145 million in State Farm). In
both cases, I was asked by the plaintiffs to file a brief to the Supreme
Court addressing the question of deterrence theory and punitive
damages. In both cases, I faced the same opponents: A. Mitchell
Polinsky and Steven Shavell, who were asked by the defendants in
Philip Morris and State Farm to file deterrence theory briefs. 5 I
continue to find it interesting that the litigating parties want to have
law-and-economics arguments addressed directly to the Court. I
hope that it reflects an accurate perception of the Court's interest in
hearing these arguments. However, I found no evidence in the State
Farm and Philip Morris opinions that the Court paid any attention to
the law-and-economics arguments offered by the opposing sides.
My involvement on the side of the trial lawyers in the last
two big Supreme Court cases on punitive damages strikes me as
ironic in some respects. I am not a natural political ally of the trial
lawyers. In fact, I have taken positions on some controversial topics
that probably would be repellent to the interest groups typically
associated with trial lawyers. 6 And yet I might appear to tort reform
proponents to have become something of a gunslinger for the trial
lawyers in recent major punitive damages cases. A similar irony has
been perceived, I suspect, by the state court judges in Utah and
Oregon that have been involved in these cases. In terms of the
divide between red (conservative) and blue (liberal) states, I do not
think you can get more "red" than Utah. The Utah judges
responsible for State Farm are probably among the most
conservative in the nation. And while Oregon is not a red state, I am
not aware of any accusations that its judiciary is especially favorable
toward plaintiffs' lawyers. Why we would observe the most
controversial punitive damages cases coming out of moderate to
5. Although we have faced off in two high-stakes cases, I have long
considered both Steve and Mitch to be friends.
6. See, e.g., Keith N. Hylton, Law and the Future of Organized Labor in
America, 49 WAYNE L. REV. 685, 696 (2003) (arguing that employer hostility has
little to do with the decline of unions); Keith N. Hylton, A Theory of Minimum
Contract Terms, with Implicationsfor Labor Law, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1741, 1747

n.22 (1996) (arguing that most research indicates that minimum wage laws reduce
the welfare of low-skilled workers); Keith N. Hylton, An Economic Theory of the
Duty to Bargain, 83 GEO. L.J. 19, 65 (1994) (explaining that workers have short

horizons and are therefore likely to favor inefficient decisions when a firm is
failing).
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conservative states is a question that is interesting on its own, and I
will return to it later.
This essay is a series of reflections on the implications of
Philip Morris for the tort reform movement, a movement for which I
share considerable sympathy. First, I offer an ideal approach to
punitive damages-based on my amicus brief in Philip Morris-and
apply that approach to the case. I make an effort to find a middle
ground between the positions of the plaintiff and defendantbecause, in any case that reaches the Supreme Court, one will find
persuasive arguments to be made on both sides. That middle ground
involves largely returning to the Supreme Court's pre-Gore
treatment of punitive damages and introducing new procedural
devices for defendants to challenge awards. Second, I examine some
of the troubling implications of Philip Morris, such as the possibility
that class actions are unconstitutional under its theory of due process.
Finally, I close with a few observations on the implications of this
case law for pain and suffering awards. The likely eventual outcome
of decisions such as Philip Morris and State Farm will be a
constitutionally-based requirement for the scheduling of pain and
suffering awards.
Part II summarizes the case. In Part III, I lay out an ideal
approach to punitive damages based on the arguments I have made
in briefs to the Supreme Court in the major punitive damages cases.
I invest more effort here in attempting to address the concerns of
defendants than was possible in the briefs. In Part IV, I apply this
approach to the facts of Philip Morris. In Part V, I discuss the
approach used by the Court in Philip Morris. In Part VI, I discuss
the troubling implications of Philip Morris, and Part VII concludes.

II.

THE CASE

The facts of Philip Morris are simple. The husband of
Mayola Williams (Jesse Williams, but for simplicity I will refer to7
him as "the husband") began smoking cigarettes in the early 1950s,

the time period in which the cigarette companies were becoming
fully aware of the health risks connected to smoking while refusing

7. Williams v. Philip Morris, Inc., 48 P.3d 824, 829 (Or. Ct. App. 2002),
vacated, 540 U.S. 801 (2003).
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to issue any warnings publicly. 8 This was also before the
introduction of the Surgeon General's warning on every pack of
cigarettes. 9 During the period in which the husband took up
smoking, cigarette companies were not simply refusing to disclose
health risks; they were publicly denying health risk claims and even
paying spokespeople to publicly reject claims that cigarettes were
linked to cancer. 10 This is all beyond debate from what I gather, as it
is well understood that there was a significant period during which
the conduct of the major cigarette companies could be described as
the perpetration of a fraud on the cigarette consuming public.
The husband continued to smoke for the rest of his life until
he died from lung cancer in 1997.11 Mayola Williams brought a tort
suit in Oregon claiming fraud against Philip Morris. She claimed
that her husband relied on the denials of health risks from the
company, and that this reliance was a major reason that he continued
to smoke. 12 Of course, she also claimed that the lung cancer was
caused by smoking. 13 The jury found Philip Morris liable and
included a punitive award for $79.5 million, which is equal to the
company's profits for a 2.5 week period in the year in which the
judgment was awarded. 14 The $79.5 million punitive award was
reduced by the trial judge, but restored by the appeals court. 5 The
Supreme Court of Oregon denied Philip Morris's request for
review. 16
8. Id.at831.
9. Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79
Stat. 282 (1965) (codified at 15 U.S.C. 36, §§ 1331-1341 (1965)).
10. STANTON A. GLANTZ ET AL., THE CIGARETTE PAPERS 2 (1996).
11. Williams, 48 P.3d at 829.

12. Id. Despite encouragement from his wife and children to stop smoking
because cigarettes were dangerous to his health, Williams continued because he
insisted that cigarette companies would not sell a dangerous product and that the
companies never said anything about smoking being harmful. Williams told his
family that he heard on television that cigarettes did not cause cancer and that he
read articles asserting that cigarette smoking was not dangerous. Williams
eventually made attempts to stop smoking but they were all unsuccessful.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 841.
15. Id. at 828, 843.
16. Williams v. Philip Morris, Inc., 61 P.3d 938 (Or. 2002) (unpublished
table opinion); Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057, 1061 (2007).
There are details that my sketch in the text leaves out. The trial court found for
Mayola Williams on both the negligence and fraud claims, and awarded her
$21,485.80 in economic damages and $800,000 in non-economic damages.
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Philip Morris challenged the large punitive award in the U.S.
Supreme Court on grounds that go to the core of the deterrence
argument for punitive damages. Philip Morris argued that, in light of
State Farm, it is never constitutionally permissible to multiply an
award to take into account harms to people other than the plaintiff
before the court.17 On February 20, 2007 the Supreme Court issued
an opinion agreeing with Philip Morris's argument, vacating 8the
judgment, and remanding the case to the Oregon Supreme Court. 1
Philip Morris announces the bold proposition that the
Constitution's Due Process Clause does not permit a jury to base a
punitive award on the desire to punish a defendant for harming
persons who are not before the court. 19 Such an award would
amount to a taking of property without due process. 20 However,
Philip Morris also holds that harm to others can be considered as
part of the reprehensibility analysis in a punitive damages case. 21

Williams, 48 P.3d at 828. The jury awarded $79.5 million for punitive damages on
the fraud claim. Id. The trial judge reduced the punitive damage award to $32
million on the ground that the $79.5 million was unconstitutionally excessive. Id.
The trial judge also reduced the non-economic damages to $500,000 in accordance
with Oregon's statutory cap on punitive damages. Id. Mayola Williams appealed
the reduction of punitive damages and Philip Morris appealed rulings related to the
fraud and negligence claims. Id. The Court of Appeals of Oregon affirmed the
trial court's decision on the fraud claim, and, after finding that the jury's award
was not excessive under the guidelines set by Oregon's high court and the U.S.
Supreme Court, reversed the trial judge's reduction of punitive damages. id. at
842. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded
the case back to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration consistent with State
Farm. Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Williams, 540 U.S. 801, 801 (2003). On
remand, the Oregon appeals court upheld its previous ruling that the $79.5 million
punitive damages award was not unconstitutionally excessive. Williams v. Philip
Morris, Inc., 92 P.3d 126 (Or. Ct. App. 2004). In 2006, the Supreme Court of
Oregon reviewed the case and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Williams v. Philip Morris, Inc., 127 P.3d 1165 (Or. 2006). The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the punitive damages award. Philip
Morris USA v. Williams, 126 S. Ct. 2329 (2006). The Supreme Court vacated and
remanded the case. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057 (2007).
17. Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1062.
18. Id. at 1063.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 1066.
21. Id. at 1064.
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THE THEORY OF DETERRENCE AND PUNITIVE AWARDS

I have made simple points in my briefs to the Court on
punitive damages.
Punitive awards serve one of either two
functions: they internalize losses that are not effectively internalized
through compensatory damages, and they eliminate gains from
offensive conduct.2 2 The theory of damages has been developed
over centuries, starting with philosophers of law like Beccaria and
Bentham. 23 My contribution in this area has been to synthesize these
arguments, to provide additional rigor where necessary, and to apply
them to the punitive damages case law. 24
The internalization theory gives us one justification for
multiplying compensatory awards.
Under this theory, it is
appropriate to multiply a punitive award in order to make up for the
number of times that a tortfeasor gets away with harming people
without having to pay any damages. Thus, if a tortfeasor's conduct
imposes a loss of $100 on someone every day, and only one out of
two of those victims sue for the loss, a proper damage award for
internalization would be $200. In this case, the additional $100
added to the compensatory award is a punitive award designed to
internalize the total losses imposed on society.
The gain elimination theory offers an alternative perspective
on the function of a punitive award. Under this theory, an award
should never be less than the profit earned by the offender from
some offensive act. Suppose, for example, that the offender does
some offensive act that imposes a loss on the victim of $100 and also
leads to a gain to the offender of $500. If the damage award is
limited to the compensatory (internalization) level, the offender will
still gain $400 from his conduct even after being forced to pay a
compensatory damage award. The gain-eliminating approach would
require a penalty no less than $500. Thus, in this example, the court
would issue a compensatory award of $100 and a punitive judgment
of at least $400.
22. Keith N. Hylton, Punitive Damages and the Economic Theory of
Penalties, 87 GEO. L.J. 421,425 (1998).
23. Id. at 425-27; Brief Amicus Curiae of Professor Keith N. Hylton et al. in
Support of Respondents at 10-11, Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057
(2007) (No. 05-1256).
24. Hylton, supra note 22, at 430-460; Keith N. Hylton, The Theory of
Penaltiesand the Economics of CriminalLaw, 1 REv. L. & ECON. 175 (2005).
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When should a court choose internalization and when gain
elimination? Gain elimination is appropriate when the offender's
conduct is always socially undesirable or when it amounts to a
nonconsensual taking of some sort. 25 Under these conditions,
complete deterrence is the appropriate goal. Internalization is
appropriate for the remaining cases-e.g., where the defendant's
conduct is in general socially desirable, but it nevertheless imposes
losses on victims.
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell wrote an article
arguing that the internalization theory should be used to determine
punitive damage awards. 26 I disagree. The vast majority of punitive
damages cases involve conduct that is always socially undesirable or
a taking of some sort. These cases are appropriate for the gain
elimination (complete deterrence) theory. The total damage award in
these cases should be no less than the level required to eliminate the
offender's gain from the harmful conduct.

IV.

APPLYING THEORY TO PHILIPMORRIS

The Oregon courts never explained precisely what the
punitive award was designed to do in Philip Morris. Nor did the
courts explain whether the award was designed to internalize losses
suffered by other smokers or to eliminate part of Philip Morris's
profits.
However, the appellate court's decision to use the
company's profit as a basis for calculating punitive damages
suggests that the court was attempting
to eliminate the company's
27
gain from fraudulent conduct.

The theory of penalties set out above suggests that this is
perfectly sensible. Philip Morris, and other cigarette companies
operating during the period of time after health risks were largely
understood by cigarette makers and before health warnings became
routine, engaged in a fraud on the public. They sold cigarettes
without revealing the information they held privately on the health
risks of smoking. Indeed, they deliberately issued or procured from
25. Hylton, supra note 22, at 439-44.
26. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic
Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REv. 869 (1998).
27. Williams v. Philip Morris, Inc., 48 P.3d 824, 841 (Or. Ct. App. 2002),
vacated, 540 U.S. 801 (2003).
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others false statements regarding the health risks of smoking.28 They
did this in order to continue to sell cigarettes in high numbers. This
is conduct that is unambiguously socially undesirable.
Under the theory of penalties, the proper penalty is one that
eliminates the gain enjoyed by Philip Morris from each fraudulent
transaction during the period in which the company engaged in
fraud. This could be a lot of money. The amount depends on the
length of the period in which unambiguous fraud took place and the
number of transactions that could be described as fraudulent.
Perhaps the period of fraud is not that long. Perhaps the companies
themselves were unsure of the health risks for most of the period
before the imposition of the Surgeon General's warning. However,
it is generally accepted, I believe, that the companies came to a
rather complete understanding of the health risks at some point in
time before they began to publicly admit them. The period after the
more-or-less full understanding was acquired and before the public
admissions of health risks is the window period in which
unambiguous fraud took place.
Under the gain-elimination
approach, the profits that can be attributed to the fraud should be
eliminated.
It has been suggested that a large damage award imposed so
long after the period of fraudulent conduct might be ineffective
because it merely punishes the current set of Philip Morris
shareholders without really imposing a penalty on the officers and
owners who were present during the period of fraudulent conduct.29
The flaw in this argument is its implication that a penalty imposed
tomorrow for offensive conduct today should be viewed as
ineffective. That implication is wrong. A rational actor who
engages in offensive conduct today should, under an ideal legal
system, anticipate punishment in the future. Under an ideal system,
the punishment should be sufficient to eliminate any gains the bad
actor enjoys today-taking into account the time-value of money. 30
28. GLANTZ ET AL., supra note 10, at 171-99; ALLAN M. BRANDT, THE
CIGARETTE

CENTURY:

THE RISE, FALL, AND DEADLY PERSISTENCE OF THE

PRODUCT THAT DEFINED AMERICA 159-207 (2007); Howard Markel, Tracing the
Cigarette'sPathfrom Sexy to Deadly, N.Y. TIMES, March 20, 2007, at F5.

29. Amicus Curiae Brief of A. Mitchell Polinsky et al. in Support of
Petitioner at 5, Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057 (2007) (No. 051256).
30. Brief of Keith N. Hylton as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at
36-42, Johnson v. Ford Motor Co., 113 P.3d 82 (Cal. 2005) (No. S121723).
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The theory offered here suggests that the $79.5 million
punitive judgment against Philip Morris may have been appropriate
as a matter of deterrence policy. Indeed, the theory suggests that the
large punitive award probably was appropriate and may have been
far less than the amount required to provide the proper deterrent
signal to firms that consider engaging in fraud.
A.

Some Extremely Important Questions of Detail

There are questions of detail that may lead to a different
answer than the one I have suggested so far. For example, we do not
know if Mayola Williams's husband really relied on the fraudulent
statements of Philip Morris durin the period in which he smoked.
The trial court found that he did,3 but perhaps he did not. Perhaps
he would have continued smoking even if Philip Morris had revealed
most of the key, uncontestable findings on health risks to the
smokers of their cigarettes.
There is also the problem of redundant penalties. Suppose
Philip Morris had already paid settlements or damage judgments for
some of the same transactions as the one involved in this lawsuit. To
the extent Philip Morris had already settled, it should not be forced
to pay again.
Even if Mayola Williams's husband relied on the fraudulent
statements of Philip Morris, maybe some of the other Oregon
citizens who smoked at the same time as the husband did not rely on
those statements. If they did not, then it would be inappropriate to
treat the sales to them as fraudulent transactions.
The gaineliminating portion of any penalty assessed on behalf of those
consumers should be reduced accordingly.
B.

The Core Issue: Aggregation and Claim
Heterogeneity

The core issue in Philip Morris, as in State Farm, is whether
a court is permitted to consider the harm to others in calculating a
punitive award.32 That is, after all, how a court winds up with a
damage award of almost $80 million to one smoker.
31. Williams, 48 P.3d at 831-32.
32. Id. at 837; State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408,
419-20 (2003).
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To take a simple example, suppose the defendant commits
fraud against ten people every year, and gets sued only once. Each
time the defendant commits fraud, it steals $10 from its victim. The
damage award to the individual victim is only $10. However, if the
court considers the damage to others over the year of the defendant's
conduct, the sum comes up to $100 ($10 loss to the victim plus $90
loss to others).
This simple example captures the central economic issue in
the Supreme Court's recent punitive damages cases. On one hand,
as many courts and commentators have wondered, why let one
plaintiff who suffered a loss of $10 walk away with a judgment of
$100? Wouldn't this guarantee a long list of plaintiffs, some of
whom may not have suffered any harm at all? Doesn't this approach
treat all potential plaintiffs the same, when in fact their stories may
differ greatly? On the other hand, if most victims of fraud don't sue,
failing to award punitive damages is equivalent to giving the green
light to perpetrators of fraud. If, after all, I can commit sufficient
fraud to strip people of a total of $100 per year, and then expect to
pay only $10 in damages, then I'll find the fraud business a good
racket to stay in for life.
The questions raised here are observed both in a substantial
class of punitive damages cases and in class actions. In both sets of
cases, the core problem is whether issues are general to the class or
individualized. To return to my example above, if all of the issues
are general to the class of victims, there is nothing wrong, in
deterrence terms, with stripping the defendant of the total harm he
has imposed on victims ($100) with one punitive damages judgment.
Similarly, there would be nothing wrong in that case, on deterrence
grounds, in recognizing a class of victims and allowing them to
collect $100. But if the issues are not general to the class, then there
certainly are potential problems in recognizing a class. The
aggregated or multiplied judgment could vastly exceed the socially
optimal penalty and could therefore over-deter the defendant's
conduct. For this reason, it is possible to defend on economic
grounds the decisions of some courts-as in the recent Florida $145
billion smokers case-to refuse to certify classes in which the issues
are too individualized to justify a class-wide judgment.33

33. Engle v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 122 F. Supp. 2d 1355, 1358 n.1
(S.D. Fla. 2000).
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The core of the problem in punitive and class actions is the
same. In punitive cases, we are looking at an award that is designed
to provide a remedy for or penalty on behalf of the potential
plaintiffs who are not present in court. In class actions, we are
looking at an award that is designed to provide a remedy for or
penalty on behalf of plaintiffs who are there in court in only a
fictional sense, while being represented by one particular plaintiff.
In both cases, an award that strips all illicit gains or internalizes the
aggregate harm is based on an extrapolation, aggregation, or
multiplication of the gain to the offender or harm to the victim
observed in the offender's conduct toward a single representative
plaintiff.
State Farm confused the core issue by addressing the
enforcement of rights of citizens of particular states with different
legal systems. 34 The more important question is whether a
multiplied award effectively creates a class out of a group with
individualized issues. And this problem exists whether the victims
are all state residents or residents of other states.
In view of this core issue, when is aggregation or
multiplication of damages appropriate on deterrence grounds? There
are a few problems that make damages for the missing plaintiffs
difficult to aggregate. One is that some of the missing plaintiffs may
be under a different legal regime, specifically a regime in which the
defendant's conduct would be lawful. This was the issue that
bothered the Court in State Farm.35 A second issue is that even if
the law governing the plaintiff and the missing plaintiffs is uniform,
perhaps those plaintiffs have very different cases. Some plaintiffs
may have been guilty of negligence themselves. Some plaintiffs
may have suffered harm from some other cause. In other words,
causation and contributory fault defenses may vary across the
population of victims, and this may make aggregation inappropriate
and a damage multiplier inappropriate too. All of these issues can be
summed up by the label claim heterogeneity.
Whether claim heterogeneity makes aggregation or
multiplication inappropriate on deterrence grounds is also a function
of the nature of the offender's conduct. If the defendant's conduct is
either expropriative or uniformly harmful on welfare grounds, there
is no reason to worry about over-deterrence of the offender's
34. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 421-22.
35. Id.
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conduct. Complete deterrence of the offender's conduct is the
socially appropriate goal. Given this, there is no reason on
deterrence grounds to limit aggregation because of the problem of
claim heterogeneity. To return to my earlier numerical example,
suppose an offender's transactions with each one of ten victims are
unambiguously fraudulent, leading to a loss of $10 to nine of the
victims and only $1 to the last victim. Suppose the court imposed a
total damage award of $100 on the offender. This would appear to
over-internalize the harm suffered by the last victim. However, since
the offender's conduct offers no social benefit whatsoever, there is
no cost associated with over-deterrence in this case.
In the case in which complete deterrence is the socially
appropriate goal, there may still be some reasons to limit the damage
award, but they would have to be based on second-order deterrence
concerns or on concerns that are unrelated to deterrence. One
second-order concern is marginal deterrence. 36 The marginal
deterrence concern is that if the penalty is set too high, the offender
may have an incentive to choose the most harmful of a set of harmful
options. For example, imposing the death penalty on purse snatchers
would give them an incentive to murder their victims in order to
facilitate the taking of their purses. The marginal deterrence concern
therefore leads us to moderate penalties in order to avoid giving the
offender an incentive to choose an even more harmful act. Another
reason for limiting the award in the complete deterrence context is a
concern that high awards may induce too many people to bring
claims to court, which would be costly to society, especially if some
of the claims are frivolous.
If, on the other hand, the defendant's conduct provides some
benefits to society (that is, it is not uniformly harmful), then
complete deterrence of the defendant's conduct is no longer the
appropriate goal. In this case, one should worry about overdeterrence. In the case in which the defendant's conduct is not
uniformly harmful, claim heterogeneity provides an important reason
for putting a limit on a punitive award. Indeed, in some cases victim
claims will be heterogeneous precisely because the offender's
conduct is not uniformly harmful.
Suppose, returning to the numerical example, the offender's
conduct is unambiguously fraudulent with respect to five of its
36. Brief of Professor Keith N. Hylton, supra note 23, at 11.
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transactions and not fraudulent with respect to the other five. This
might be the case because five of the offender's customers relied on
the offender's fraudulent statements, while the other five did not rely
and would not have changed their conduct even if the offender had
told the truth. Presumably, the five non-relying purchasers gained
utility in their transaction with the offender. In this case, the
offender's conduct provides a benefit to society, in the form of
enhanced utility to the purchasers who are indifferent as to its claims.
Because of this benefit, there is no reason on deterrence grounds to
reduce the offender's activity to zero. A punitive award that
attempts to strip the gains to the offender from all of its transactions
probably would over-deter his conduct.
The foregoing example applies to Philip Morris. Unlike the
conduct alleged in State Farm, the defendant in Philip Morris
could plausibly argue that there was a subset of cigarette purchasers
who were not victims of fraud.38 Victims in this subset would have
purchased cigarettes even if the companies had accurately disclosed
health risks. This suggests that aggregation could lead to socially
excessive damages. It would have been quite difficult for the
defendant in State Farm to make this argument, because in order to
do so, State Farm would have had to assert that there were some
victims of bad faith conduct in the insurance market that did not
mind being victimized in this way at all. Such an argument would
have been preposterous on its face. But in the context of smoking,
some consumers of cigarettes apparently do so with full awareness of
the health risks. For those consumers, one can only conclude that
their perceived utility from smoking outweighs the perceived health
costs.
C.

Determining the AppropriatePunitiveAward

What does this imply for punitive awards? The Supreme
Court's response to these issues, which are in the background and
inadequately addressed in the opinions, has been to attempt to

37. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 408.
38. See Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057, 1063 (2007)
(implying a defense against damages would be possible if the plaintiff knew the
activity was dangerous or did not rely upon misleading information from the
defendant).
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restrain or put a ceiling on punitive damage awards. 39 That is
unhelpful. It is a good approach from the perspective of defendants
who may be hit with large punitive judgments, but not necessarily
good for society. The proper response is to require the litigants to
answer the questions about the appropriateness of aggregation or
multiplication. That raises the issue of which party (plaintiff or
defendant) should have the burden of proof on these questions, but I
will treat this issue as subsidiary to the core issue of the
appropriateness of aggregation.
As the foregoing discussion of theory suggests, there are
several issues that have to be considered in designing the appropriate
penalty. Focus for the moment on the multiplier-the case in which
a plaintiff seeks a large punitive award to punish the defendant for
harms done to many other plaintiffs. If a multiplier is requested, the
court needs to answer several questions. First, is the defendant's
conduct uniformly reprehensible (i.e., reprehensible with respect to
all transactions), so that a complete deterrence policy would be
appropriate? If so, then there is no deterrence-based argument for
questioning an aggregated award when there are many victims.
There may be other bases for questioning or challenging the award,
but they would be based on something other than deterrence, or
perhaps what I have described earlier as a second-order deterrence
concern (e.g., marginal deterrence). If on the other hand, the
defendant's conduct is in some respects socially beneficial, then the
court should be concerned about the possibility of over-deterrence.
In this case, the following questions should be considered.
Is the multiplier designed to provide a penalty on behalf of
plaintiffs injured in areas where defendant's conduct is legal?
Obviously, a plaintiff should not be able to collect on behalf of
plaintiffs whose rights have not been violated in any legally
recognized sense. As a practical matter, this should not be observed
much at all. Punitive damages are reserved, under the law, for
unambiguously bad conduct. Conduct that is legal in some states
and illegal in others usually would not satisfy the reprehensibility
requirement for a punitive award. Murder, offensive battery, theft,
fraud, and similarly bad conduct are illegal everywhere you go, and
that is what punitive damages are designed to cover. Still, if it does
happen-if the plaintiff obtains a punitive award in connection to

39. Id.
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defendant conduct that is lawful in some states-then courts have a
duty to disaggregate hypothetical plaintiffs. Hypothetical plaintiffs
whose rights have not been violated should have their claims
decoupled and discarded.
Next, the court should make a determination-same as in
class actions-whether individual issues dominate and, if so, how
much. Ideally, the court should be able to narrow the multiplier to
the point where it covers the appropriate penalty for a class of
victims with homogeneous injury claims. This implies that in a case
involving smokers, a penalty for hypothetical plaintiffs should be
permitted only for those plaintiffs who match the one in court on
issues such as reliance, contributory fault, and causation. Thus, a
smoker who took up the habit long after the government and industry
began issuing regular warnings to the public should not be treated as
within the same hypothetical plaintiff class as a smoker who took up
the habit back in the old days when many reputable-seeming sources
were disputing the possibility that smoking could be harmful.
Consider the following illustration, based loosely on the facts
of Philip Morris. Suppose the defendant sells cigarettes, while
fraudulently misstating the health risks, to 40,000 consumers. The
defendant earns, over the relevant period, $10 per consumer. Half of
the consumers relied on the fraudulent statements, the other half
would have continued to purchase the cigarettes even if accurate
health risk information had been provided.
Since the transactions
with 20,000 consumers were unambiguously fraudulent, the gains
from those transactions should be stripped. For the fraud victims,
the gains to the defendant amount to $200,000. Now, suppose the
plaintiff receives a compensatory award of $100,000. Under the
theory presented here, the minimum gain-stripping award is
$200,000, which implies a punitive award of $100,000. Such an
award would remove all profit from the business of fraudulently

40. One might argue that it is impossible to know whether half of the
consumers relied on the statements of the seller. If it were impossible to find a
reasonably accurate estimate of the percentage of consumers who were real
victims of fraud (i.e., who really relied on the seller's statements), then it would
follow that the approach suggested here could not be implemented. Individual
plaintiffs would have to be satisfied with compensatory awards. The deterrence
objective could be pursued through statutory penalties. However, I find it difficult
to believe that it would be impossible to find reasonably accurate estimates of the
percentage of consumers who relied on the seller's statements.
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misstating health risks to consumers who relied on the health
disclosures of the seller.
D.

Distributionof Punitive Award

After the claim heterogeneity issues are taken into account,
the state can do whatever it wants with the punitive award under the
theory presented here. It can hand it over to the victim, or it can put
the award in a fund for similar victims. This is simply a matter of
distribution--or call it a distributive justice concern. Different states
may have different notions about how the money should be divvied
up. Of course, given that we want someone to sue to stop a
perpetrator of fraud, it would make sense to offer the plaintiff some
nontrivial portion of the punitive award as a bounty.
The goal that should not be sacrificed because of distribution
concerns is deterrence. Punitive and class action awards should exist
because they serve an important deterrent function in the law.
Without them, the worst offenders will find bad conduct profitable,
and there are not enough government regulators in the world to stop
them.
E.

Burdens in PunitiveDamages Litigation

Who should have the burden of proof on issues that must be
resolved in order to design the right penalty? The ideal regime
would be one in which the plaintiff has the burden of proof in
arguing that an aggregate gain-eliminating penalty, which effectively
multiplies the gain-stripping portion due solely to the plaintiff, is
appropriate.
The defendant should have the burden of proof
regarding the details of aggregation-i.e., in showing that the
individualized questions outweigh the common questions to a degree
that suggests that multiplication would be inappropriate.
Putting the burden of proof on the plaintiff to make the case
for a multiplied award involves no innovation in the law at all.
Plaintiffs already have the burden to prove that a defendant is guilty
of negligent or intentionally offensive conduct. To make the case for
a multiplied award is simply a matter of proving that there were
many victims other than the plaintiff. In many cases, this will be
clear.
Moreover, if the offender's conduct justifies a gaineliminating award, there should be an immediate presumption that
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the appropriate penalty will be sufficient (at a minimum) to eliminate
the offender's gain. It should be the defendant's burden from this
stage to show that the proposed penalty is too large.
Perhaps the key reason it should be the defendant's burden to
make the case against a large punitive award is that such a case often
depends on evidence that is privately held by the defendant. It is
often the defendant that knows how many victims of its conduct
exist and whether it has been fined by other courts for the same
conduct. Once a plaintiff has made the case for a substantial
punitive award, the door should be opened to the defendant to make
the case that the court's proposed award is unreasonably high.
The strongest
Consider, for example, Philip Morris.
arguments against the large punitive award in that case are (1) that it
includes a gain-stripping component for transactions with consumers
who may not have been victims of fraud (claim heterogeneity) and
(2) that it may impose or lead to the future imposition of a redundant
penalty (redundancy).
The first argument points to the serious difficulty of
determining the number of real victims of Philip Morris's deceitful
conduct. Indeed, perhaps Mayola Williams's husband was not a
victim of fraud. There is no way to tell in the abstract. We are
forced to rely on the trial court's finding that he was a victim of
fraud. However many real victims existed, it should be clear that the
position that there were no real victims is quite unlikely to be valid.
Was Mayola Williams's husband the only real victim of
fraud perpetrated by the cigarette makers during the period in which
he smoked? To believe so, one would have to think that there were
virtually no smokers during the relevant time period who would have
changed their conduct if the cigarette companies had issued the sort
of health warnings then that they issue today. Whatever may be the
truth of the matter, this is highly unlikely. Among adult males in the
U.S., the percentage of smokers is now less than 24%. 4 ' In 1955, the
percentage of smokers among adult males in the U.S. was 56.9%.42

41. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, FACT SHEET: ADULT
SMOKING IN THE UNITED STATES: CURRENT ESTIMATES (2006), available at

http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/data-statistics/Factsheets/adult-cig-smoking.htm
(last visited Sept. 14, 2007).
42. Study Shows Drop in Percentage of Adult Americans Who Smoke, N.Y.
TIMES, May 6, 1981, at A28.
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The lower percentage today reflects a range of factors. One of them
is the greater availability of health risk information.
In any event, it should be possible as an empirical matter to
determine the percentage of smokers within the cohort that included
Mayola Williams's husband that would have continued smoking
even if the cigarette makers had issued accurate statements about the
health effects of smoking. 43 The party in litigation in the best
position to offer such evidence is Philip Morris. The cigarette
companies have studied the reactions of consumers to various
advertising campaigns.4 4
With respect to the second issue, redundancy, it should be
clear that Philip Morris is capable of proving in the current litigation,
or in any future trial, that it has already paid a penalty on behalf of
fraud victims within the same cohort as Mayola Williams's husband.
This is evidence that is obviously in the hands of the defendant and
could be presented to the court with ease.
In general, the law should be structured so that the party with
the best information on claim heterogeneity or redundancy should
have an incentive to reveal that information in court. In the typical
case involving an offender whose conduct has harmed a large
number of victims, it will be the offender that is in the best position
to know whether the victims have heterogeneous injury claims or
whether it has paid a penalty on behalf of the victims already.
F.

A Suggested Approach to Determination and Review

The extremely important details considered to this point do
not disturb the fundamental theoretical bases for punitive awards.
The details may be so important that they lead to a completely
different result than that suggested by theory and a broad-brush
description of the facts. For example, the reliance finding alone, in a

43. As I noted earlier, one could take the position that it is impossible to
determine the percentage of smokers within the relevant cohort who relied on the
statements of cigarette sellers. If this position were valid, it would follow that one
could not determine an appropriate aggregate gain-stripping penalty. However, I
find this position implausible, and in any event it should be subjected to empirical
investigation to determine whether it has any merit.
44. Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously:
Some Evidence of Market Manipulation, 112 HARV. L. REv. 1420, 1480-81
(1999).
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fraud case, might be based on such questionable evidence that it
should not be allowed to stand as justification for a large award.
It is important, however, for courts to distinguish basic theory
from matters of detail. The Supreme Court has not come close to
doing this, largely because it has not attempted to set out the
theoretical bases for punitive awards. In other words, the theoretical
explanations that the court has willingly examined in some areas,
such as antitrust, remain an unexplored terrain in the context of
punitive damages. As a result, the court has produced confusing
opinions that fail to articulate principles for determining whether a
punitive award is appropriate.
The account given here suggests an algorithm of the
following sort for determining and reviewing punitive awards. If the
defendant is found guilty of some reprehensible act that justifies a
punitive award, the initial presumption should be that there will be a
punitive award that is no less than the amount required to strip gains
from transactions with or conduct harming the victims. Moreover, if
the conduct is truly reprehensible, this amount should be considered
a minimum level that courts can exceed at their discretion.
To minimize the risk of erroneous punitive judgments, courts
should adopt a "clear and convincing" standard with respect to the
reprehensibility test. 4 5 If the appellate court reviewing a punitive

award is still in doubt as to whether the offender's conduct satisfied
the reprehensibility requirement, it should seek to constrain the
punitive award to the minimum gain-stripping level.46
If the plaintiff has satisfied the standards required to obtain a
punitive award, it should be the responsibility of the defendant to
offer arguments and evidence favoring a reduction in the award. If,
for example, there is uncertainty as to whether a reprehensible act
occurred, the defendant will have every incentive to bring this
uncertainty to the court's attention. It should be the defendant's
45. This is consistent with the law of most states. See, e.g., Denise E.
Antolini, Punitive Damages in Rhetoric and Reality: An Integrated Empirical
Analysis of Punitive Damages Judgments in Hawaii, 1985-2001, 20 J.L. & POL.
143, 185 (2004) ("Of the forty-six states that allow punitive damage awards,
twenty-four states require clear and convincing evidence, four states apply various
standards of proof according to the underlying claim, and eight states require only
a preponderance of the evidence.").
46. Brief of Keith N. Hylton as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at
28-30, State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003) (No. 011289).
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responsibility to do so, rather than the plaintiffs responsibility to
prove the negative proposition that there is no uncertainty. If the
defendant has already paid the penalty that is part of the punitive
judgment, this should be a reason to reduce the award, and the
defendant should have the responsibility to bring this to the court's
If the punitive award aggregates claims that are
attention.
heterogeneous, this may be a basis for reducing the punitive award,
provided that there is some evidence that the defendant's conduct
It should be the
was not uniformly socially undesirable.47
defendant's responsibility, not the plaintiffs, to bring these
arguments to the court's attention.
Since states have developed reasonable rules regarding the
requirements for a punitive award, the Supreme Court's most useful
decision would be to remove itself from regulating the substance of
punitive awards and return to the pre-Gore emphasis on procedure.
The Supreme Court should adopt doctrines that require strong proof
of reprehensibility and effectively require lower courts to permit
defendants to challenge awards on the grounds suggested here.
V.

PHILIPMORRIS

As I said before, the ideal approach to punitive damages
elaborated above, and outlined in my amicus brief, apparently had no
effect on the Supreme Court's decision in Philip Morris. I find some
consolation in the fact that the arguments of the law-and-economics
gunslingers on Philip Morris's side, Steve Shavell and Mitch
Polinsky, were also ignored by the Court.
Instead of grappling with the theory of deterrence, the Court
adopted a theory of procedural due process under which it is
unconstitutional to do precisely what deterrence theory indicates one
should do in the case of a recidivist, infrequently punished
wrongdoer. Consider the case of a wrongdoer who steals $100 from
one victim every day, and is punished with a monetary fine for only
47. In some cases, claim heterogeneity alone may provide a sufficient basis
for limiting the award. Consider Philip Morris. An aggregated gain-stripping
judgment poses the risk of imposing on the defendant a penalty for transactions
with smokers who did not care whether they were being told the truth about health
risks (i.e., smokers who did not rely on the firm's statements). The existence of

these types within the hypothetical victim class is a consequence of the fact that
the firm's conduct was not fraudulent with respect to all smokers within Jesse
Williams's cohort.
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50% of those harms. Deterrence theory requires a penalty of at least
$200 in each instance of punishment. Yet, the Court has adopted a
theory of due process that apparently forecloses this very sensible
solution to a common problem in the context of punitive damages.
This is troubling on a number of grounds.
First, as noted in the previous parts, the concern that most
clearly motivated the Court's decision in Philip Morris, claim
heterogeneity, is observed in the class action setting as well. The
courts have been eager, because of the same issues underlying the
Court's due process concerns with respect to punitive damages, to
adopt rules that ensure that claim aggregation does not occur in the
class action setting with respect to heterogeneous claims. 48 The
same rules that are in the process of development in the class action
context could have been imported to the punitive damages case law.
Second, the Court's theory of due process implies that class
actions are unconstitutional. Indeed, if I were a lawyer representing
defendants in class actions, I would have started strategizing, within
minutes of reading the decision, on how to use Philip Morris to put
an end to class action lawsuits. The reason is easy to state. The
differences between class actions and many punitive damages
lawsuits are, from an economic perspective, slight. 49 Plaintiffs are
seeking aggregated judgments in class action lawsuits and in many
punitive damages lawsuits. In the punitive damages lawsuit, there is
only one plaintiff in court. In the class action lawsuit, the class is
only there in theory, not in fact. The only real plaintiffs are the class
representatives. If the Due Process Clause does not permit a court to
impose a damage award or penalty on behalf of "persons who are not
before the court," 50 then it would appear to invalidate class action
lawsuits. The Court's argument in Philip Morris applies so easily to
48. See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 628 (1997)
(holding that a class must satisfy the tests of common issue predominance and
adequacy of representation).
49. Indeed, many punitive damages claims against corporations will be for
products that injure many people. In this context, punitive damages claims serve
the same deterrence function as class action lawsuits. Another type of punitive
damages claim will arise in connection with an intentional tort that occurs between
one offender and one victim-such as a punch in the nose. In this class of cases,
punitive damages have no connection at all to class actions. However, it is
obvious that Philip Morris does not apply to this second class of punitive damages
claim.
50. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057, 1060 (2007).
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class actions that it would seem to be professionally irresponsible for
class action defense attorneys not to press this point until it is
resolved by the Court.
Admittedly, one can draw technical distinctions between
class actions and punitive damages lawsuits. One could argue, for
example, that the punitive award goes only to one victim while the
class award goes to the entire class of victims. But this distinction is
weakened by the existence of split-award statutes that distribute the
proceeds of punitive judgments to others. And presumably any court
could approve a settlement in a punitive damages case that creates a
fund for similar victims not in court, thereby converting a punitive
damages lawsuit into a class action lawsuit. Alternatively, one could
argue that the punitive damages plaintiff is not necessarily
representative of the class of victims not present in court, while the
class action representatives are. But this argument can be met by, as
I have already argued, adopting rules that effectively require
representative status on the part of the punitive damages plaintiff by
preventing multiplication of heterogeneous missing-victim claims.
In terms of the fundamental deterrence objectives, class action and
punitive damages lawsuits are, in many instances, equivalent.
Third, Philip Morris will encourage obfuscation and
dishonesty from lower courts more than straightforward analysis of
the grounds for a punitive award. PhilipMorris instructs courts that
it is permissible to consider harm to other victims in determining
reprehensibility, but impermissible to actually increase an award in
an effort to punish the defendant for the harms inflicted on others. It
is a distinction that many will find confusing, as the dissenting
opinions noted.5 1 Moreover, it is a distinction that will encourage
lower courts to simply say nothing about the function of a punitive
judgment. The surest method for a court to avoid review under
Philip Morris is to talk about reprehensibility, and then to say
nothing more than that the punitive award it has imposed is a proper
response to the defendant's reprehensible conduct toward the victim.
If the court thinks that the award is appropriate because it penalizes
the defendant for conduct toward many victims, it is not in the
court's interests, after Philip Morris, to say so. That is an outcome
that serves no one's interests.

51. Id. at 1066-67 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 1068 (Thomas, J.,

dissenting).
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In addition to creating confusion and encouraging
obfuscation, the rule of Philip Morris is unlikely to provide any
substantial benefit to potential defendants. Again, consider the basic
proposition that harm to others can be taken into account in the
reprehensibility analysis, but not in the calculation of the punitive
award. This proposition is incomprehensible, because it says that an
award can be increased on the basis of reprehensibility, which is a
function of harm to others, but cannot be increased in order to
directly punish the harm done or threatened to others. The end result
will be that lower courts will focus entirely on the reprehensibility
matter and continue, in effect, to increase awards to reflect harm
done to others. But because the Supreme Court has now prevented
lower courts from addressing the harm to others in a direct and
straightforward way, it has made it more difficult for reviewing
courts to determine whether in fact a penalty is excessive on social
welfare grounds-say because it is a redundant penalty. Indeed, the
risk of redundant penalties in punitive damages litigation is probably
enhanced by the PhilipMorris decision.
Given the alternative approaches available, the only sturdy
reason that can be discerned for the Court's decision is the notion
that every person not before the court is capable of bringing his own
lawsuit and having it decided on the basis of the issues in his case.
While this sounds fine in theory, it is far from what happens in real
life. The truth is that relatively few people bring lawsuits. For
example, the vast majority of medical malpractice victims do not
sue. 52 A constitutional doctrine that prohibits punitive damage
judgments and class actions on the ground that each individual
should bring his own lawsuit has only one predictable effect: injurers
will be effectively shielded from liability for torts that affect many
victims.
Moreover, the notion that a multiplied or aggregated
punishment is inappropriate because every victim is capable of suing
on his own is hard to square with state statutes that allow for
multiple damages (e.g., consumer fraud statutes that provide for
treble damages). Treble damages provisions are often based on the
52. See A. Russell Localio et al., Relation Between Malpractice Claims and
Adverse Events Due to Negligence: Results of the HarvardMedical Malpractice
Study III, 325 NEW ENG. J. MED. 245-251 (1991) (reporting that in the state of
New York, roughly one out of seven patients injured by medical malpractice
caused by negligence brings suit).
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notion that they punish the offender for the wrongs for which he
would otherwise not be punished. If it is a violation of due process
for a state court to use a punitive judgment to punish a defendant for
harms to missing victims, then it would seem that a state statute
requiring trebling of damages raises the same due process concerns.
What, for example, would be the Court's response if Oregon were to
pass a statute trebling damages for every smoker who prevails in a
fraud action against a cigarette company? Statutes already exist at
the state level providing multiple damages in consumer fraud
actions. The justification for many of these statues is the same that
would be used to justify a punitive judgment. Are such statutes
unconstitutional under Philip Morris?

VI.

IMPLICATIONS FOR PAIN AND SUFFERING

It is strange that the tort reform movement, as reflected in the
Supreme Court, has focused on punitive damages rather than pain
and suffering awards. The notice issues identified by the Court in
State Farm apply equally well, and perhaps better, to pain and
suffering awards. 53 In addition, the theoretical case for pain and
suffering awards, unlike that for punitive damages, has always been
murky and contested. Finally, pain and suffering awards occur
frequently and have a noticeable and unavoidable effect on the tort
system. Punitive damages, in contrast, are rare.
Pain and suffering awards are difficult to justify. Much of
what I will say here can be traced, with some work of course, to
Calabresi and Melamed's famous article on remedies. 54 The
strongest economic justification for pain and suffering awards comes
in the context of "property rule violations," i.e., expropriations of
some sort (e.g., theft, battery, rape). The law governing remedies for
property and bodily integrity gives the potential victim the right to
enjoin a taking, which means that the potential victim can demand
from the potential offender a payment that compensates for the
53. See Mark A. Geistfeld, Due Process and the Determination of Pain and
Suffering Tort Damages, 55 DEPAUL L. REv. 331, 339 (2006) (suggesting that
vague jury instructions regarding pain and suffering damages deprive defendants
of fair notice of what the law requires of them).
54. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, PropertyRules, Liability Rules,
and Inalienability:One View of the Cathedral,85 HARV. L. REv. 1089 (1972).
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subjective losses that would be suffered by the victim from
transferring his entitlement to the offender. In view of this, it would
be sensible for the law of damages to include a subjective component
when there has been a taking of some sort. Pain and suffering
awards in the context of takings are therefore
justifiable on the basis
55
of the economic literature on property rules.
The other context in which a subjective element is sensible in
light of the economic literature is when the offender's conduct is
always socially undesirable. Threatened conduct that is always
socially undesirable, such as speeding in the wrong direction on a
road, probably would be enjoined by a court. Given this, a damage
award that includes a subjective component is consistent with basic
economic principles.
Indeed, punitive awards can sometimes be justified as
compensation for subjective losses. Pain and suffering awards in the
two settings just described-takings and always-socially-undesirable
conduct-would be justifiable on grounds that are somewhat similar
to the justification for punitive damages. However, the theoretical
function of punitive damage awards differs greatly from that of pain
and suffering awards. Punitive awards are designed to deter. Pain
and suffering awards are designed to compensate for the subjective
loss suffered by the victim. If a court gives a punitive award that is
actually designed to compensate for pain and suffering, then it may
be acting in an economically defensible manner while confusing
categories.
In the context of ordinary negligent acts, such as a mistake
due to negligence in the medical setting, a damage judgment
requiring compensation of objective losses is the approach adopted
by courts and accepted in the theory of damages. We know that
victims often suffer subjective losses in these cases. However, the
law has not given potential victims a right to enjoin this conduct as a
means of demanding compensation for threatened subjective losses.
When the law of damages permits compensation for subjective
losses in these cases, as it does, it permits plaintiffs to obtain
indirectly through damages what it has denied plaintiffs the right to
obtain directly through
equitable remedies. This is inconsistent and
6
difficult to justif.1

55. Keith N. Hylton, Property Rules and Liability Rules, Once Again, 2 REV.

L. & ECON. 137, 178-183 (2006).

56. Id.
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Because subjective losses exist, perhaps a case can be made
on cost-benefit grounds for including a component for subjective
losses in ordinary damage remedies for negligence." 7 However, it
would appear to be desirable in this case to schedule the subjective
component in order to make it more predictable and consistent across
cases.
The upshot of this theory is that pain and suffering awards in
the context of takings and always-socially-undesirable conduct are
justifiable on economic grounds. That is, in the traditional categories
in which punitive damages would be awarded on reprehensibility
grounds, which strongly overlaps with takings and always-sociallyundesirable categories, pain and suffering awards for subjective
losses serve the socially desirable purpose of providing a proxy form
of compensation for subjective losses. However, in the context of
ordinary negligence, pain and 58
suffering awards do not have a firm
basis in the theory of remedies.
If the Supreme Court adheres to Philip Morris, I would
predict that pain and suffering awards are next on the substantivedue-process chopping block.
The arguments that imply
constitutional impermissibility in the punitive damages context
imply the same with greater force in the case of pain and suffering
awards. Perhaps the best that plaintiffs' lawyers can hope for in this
scenario is a rule from the Court requiring the scheduling of pain and
suffering awards in order to remain within the requirements of the
emerging due process doctrine.

VII.

CONCLUSION

I return to the question I raised at the start. Why, in spite of
the business lobby's support for the decisions in State Farm and
Philip Morris, have we observed a rather confused set of political
alliances on the question of punitive damages? The answer is
simple. Political moderates and conservatives include, in addition to
the business lobby, groups that have an old-fashioned belief that bad
conduct deserves punishment. This is quite obviously the motivation
that led the Utah courts to uphold large punitive judgments against
State Farm, to the point of coming close to defying the Supreme
57. Id. at 169, 182.
58. Id. at 182-183.
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Court on remand. The Oregon courts in Philip Morris have also
come close to defiance, probably for the same reasons as the Utah
courts. I think that defiance is what we will continue to observe until
the Court adopts a rational policy on punitive damages.
A rational policy on punitive damages would give the Court a
set of consistent guidelines for determining the appropriate award
and for reviewing an award on appeal. The Court's decisions in
Gore and State Farm have suggested vague constraints (e.g., single
digit ratio of punitive to compensatory damages) while failing to
provide useful guidance on punitive damages. Philip Morris, with
its claim that considering harms to others is permissible as part of the
reprehensibility analysis but not as part of the actual calculation of a
punitive judgment, also fails to provide clear guidance. The reason
for this failure is that the Court has refused to closely examine the
theoretical rationales for punitive awards and to use those rationales
as a basis for its doctrine.

